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Redemptions from Judicial Sales




Nothing is more perplexing than the
state of our laws of redemption from
judicial sales. The subject is very large
and the problems very numerous. It was
our thought that in view of the fact that
scarcely anything exists in published
form on the subject, a comprehensive
analysis of our laws would be helpful to
the bar.
General Observations
Redemption, in its broadest sense,
means the repayment of any loan or the
payment of any debt, but in the com-
monly accepted meaning to which we
have occasion to refer, redemption means
the statutory right given to various
parties to redeem from a judicial sale.
This right being purely statutory, can-
not be exercised except within the period
of time and in the manner substantially
as pointed out in the statute. (Chicago
Savings Bank and Trust Co. v. Coleman,
283 Ill. 611).
The purpose of redemption is to sub-
ject the property of the debtor to the
payment of as many debts as possible and
to accomplish this end the Statutes are
liberally construed. (Level v. Goosman,
285 Ill. 347. Garden City Sand Co. v.
Christley, 289 Ill. 617).
The right of redemption arises by vir-
tue of two sections of the Statute. The
first is Section 16, Chapter 77, Cahill's
1927 Statutes, which was construed in
Locey Coal Mines v. C. W. & B. Coal
*Vice President, Chicago Title & Trust Co.
t Title Officer, Chicago Title & Trust Co.
Company, 131 Ill. 9, as being an abso-
lute grant of redemption from all judi-
cial sales, the Court saying: "The lan-
guage of the Statute is imperative and
seems to contemplate no exceptions."
The other is Section 24, Chapter 95,
Cahill's 1927 Statutes, which was passed
in 1879 abrogating the power of sale
in any mortgage, trust deed or other
conveyance in the nature of a mortgage,
and which provided that no real estate
should be sold to satisfy any such mort-
gage or other debt, except in pursuance
of a judgment or decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction. The statutory
right to redeem is absolute and the
parties cannot by contract destroy it.
(Bearss v. Ford, 108 Ill. 16 and Tennery
v. Nicholson, 87 Ill. 464). Regardless of
the form which the conveyance may
take, if it is in fact a mortgage, it must
be foreclosed with the consequent at-
tendant right of redemption. (Devoigne
v. Chicago Title and Trust Company, 304
I1. 177). So even though a deed is a
warranty deed absolute on its face, if
it is in fact a mortgage, that is, if In
fact the deed was given as security for
a debt, it must be foreclosed. In such
case, the grantor in the deed may file
a bill asking for the right to redeem, or
if he fails or refuses to do so, a judg-
ment creditor may file such a bill.
(Morgan v. Carson, 214 Ill. App. 569).
Before proceeding, It might be well to
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define some of the terms which we shall
use hereafter in order to avoid confusion
or the necessity of repetition. The owner
of the equity of redemption, commonly
known as the owner of the fee, becomes,
upon the entry of a decree of sale, the
owner of the right to redeem. The
holder of this right to redeem is under
no legal obligation to redeem and there
is no action which can be brought to
compel him to exercise his right. (Morgan
v. Clayton, 61 Ill. 35). This right is
probably not real estate nor is it an in-
terest in real estate legal or equitable
upon which a judgment can become a
lien. It is entirely distinct from what
is known as the equity of redemption
which was incident to the mortgage and
which was cut off by foreclosure sale.
The right of redemption is not an estate
but a mere privilege granted to the mort-
gagor whose equity of redemption has
been foreclosed. The statutory right of
redemption cannot be sold on execution.
(People for the use of Fortune Brothers
Brewing Company v. Barett, 165 Ill. App.
94 and Hill v. Blackwelder, 113 Ill. 283).
However, there are cases which hold that
since the certificate of sale is nothing
more than a right either to the redemp-
tion money or to a deed, in case no re-
demption is made, the title of the holder
of the right to redeem is, in fact, a fee
title, and that if the master's deed is
never issued to the purchaser at the fore-
closure sale, the title remains in the
holder of the right to redeem and does
not revest in him. In other words, he
never loses his title until a master's deed
actually issues. (Schroeder v. Bozarth,
224 Ill. 310 and Sutherland v. Long, 273
Ill. 309). In this discussion, however,
we shall call the owner of this right to
redeem, the owner of the fee title.
It is also necessary to point out the
distinguishing features between a decree
of foreclosure and a judgment. A decree
is entered by a court of equity and ex-
cept where expressly made so by statute
is not a lien. A decree of foreclosure is
in the nature of a decree in rem and Is
not a decree for the payment of money,
but is an alternative one ordering in
default of the payment of money, the
sale of certain specific property. Such
a decree does not in itself create a lien.
It is not such a judicial order upon which
an execution may be sued out or which
may be made the basis of a levy.
(Illinois National Bank v. School Trus-
tees, 211 Ill. 500). The decree is the
basis for the sale only of a certain spe-
cific piece of property therein described
and must contain clear and explicit direc-
tions as to how and when it shall be
sold. Thus a decree of foreclosure or-
dering the sale of the property of the
debtor "in accordance with the Statutes"
is invalid. (Crosby v. Kiest, 135 Ill.
458). Under a decree of foreclosure only
the property described in the decree may
be sold. Other property not described
in the decree belonging to the debtor
.cannot be sold to satisfy the decree. A
decree of foreclosure never outlaws, the
seven year limitation upon judgments
having no effect upon decrees of foreclo-
sure. (Kirby v. Runols, 140 Ill. 289).
It Is not until a sale of the specific
property in question has been had and
the sale was for an amount insufficient
to satisfy the decree that a so-called de-
ficiency decree may be entered, which
decree Is a money decree pure and
simple and then for the first time as-
sumes the nature of a judgment
A decree of foreclosure moreover can
be entered upon service by publication
but in such case, no deficiency decree
may be entered against the parties served
by publication. This rule was first laid
down in the old and celebrated case of
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 and has
never been questioned. The difference,
of course, is that the decree of foreclosure
is a decree in rem, while the deficiency
decree is one in personam. (Northern
Trust Company v. Sanford, 308 Ill. 381).
These are the important features of a
decree of foreclosure which have a bear-
ing on our discussion. It is, of course,
well understood that a judgment is also
the basis of a sale from which redemp-
tion may be made. A judgment is a
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purely statutory creature. It differs
from a decree of foreclosure in this im-
portant respect-it is, by statute, a lien
on all of the real property of the debtor,
whether owned at the time the judg-
ment was rendered or acquired sub-
sequent thereto. A sale under a judg-
ment is governed by the terms of the
statute which must be followed, whereas
a sale under a foreclosure decree is
governed by the terms of the decree as
we have pointed out.
Another important point which must
be remembered is the difference in the
mechanics of redemption existing by vir-
tue of the Statute of 1917 dealing with
judgments and decrees. This statute
was repealed in 1921 restoring the law
to the condition existing prior to 1917.
The repealing statute of 1921, however,
contained a savings clause by which the
machinery of the 1917 Statute was saved
for mortgages made between July 1, 1917,
and June 30, 1921, or judgments ren-
dered during that period. The limita-
tions of space will not permit us to go
into a discussion of redemptions under
the 1917 Act and it is therefore to be
understood that we are dealing with re-
demptions under the present statutes and
those which existed prior to 1917.
One more point must be borne in mind.
That is, a decree and sale thereunder
supersedes the mortgage upon which it
is based and the identity of such mort-
gage is completely lost. The mortgage
and the liability thereunder is merged
in the decree. Thus, a sale under such
a decree exonerates the property from
the lien of the indebtedness and the sub-
sequent rights of the creditors are de-
termined solely by the decree and not
by the terms of the original mortgage.
(Lightcap v. Bradley, 186 Ill. 510). But
until the sale of the property is com-
pleted, the entry of a decree does not
extinguish the lien and the creditor may
abandon his proceedings and sue upon
his note at law. (Morgan v. Sherwood,
53 Ill. 171). Nor does the fact that a
judgment has been obtained upon the
note sought to be foreclosed bar a fore-
closure decree. (Van Sant v. Allmon,
23 Ill. 30. Banchard v. Kohn, 157 Ill.
579). Thereafter, the trust deed or
mortgage remains as security for the
judgment and may be foreclosed to sat-
isfy the judgment. But a sale of real
estate either under a judgment or a
decree satisfies such judgment or decree
as to the property described in the decree
or which the judgment creditor selected
for sale and forever frees such property
from the mortgage foreclosed or the
judgment. In other words, even though
the sale did not produce enough to pay
the decree or judgment in full, the mort-
gagee or judgment creditor cannot re-
sort a second time to the property thus
sold for the payment of his deficiency.
His remedies are exhausted as to that
property. This rule is subject to one
exception only, and that is, if the debtor
who is primarily liable for the debt
which was the basis of the sale, acquires
the title subsequent to the sale by re-
demption or otherwise, the property in
his hands is liable for the unpaid bal-
ance of the debt, that is, for the de-
ficiency, and may again be subjected to
sale for the payment thereof. (Ogle v.
Koerner, 140 Ill. 170, Strause v. Dutch
250 Ill. 326).
Redemptions Within Twelve Months
Redemptions fall in two great classes:
(1) Redemptions within twelve months
after sale, and
(2) Redemptions after twelve months
after the sale and within fifteen
months.
The effect upon the title to real estate
of these two classes of redemptions is
entirely different. The difference may
be tersely stated to be that by redemp-
tion within the twelve months period
no matter by whom made, no title is
acquired by the redemptioner, whereas
by virtue of a redemption properly made
and completed after the twelve months
period, the redemptioner acquires the
title to the property. With this Impor-
tant distinction constantly In mind, we
now proceed to discuss first the redemp-
tions which may be made within the
twelve months period.
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The statute gives the right to redeem
to "any defendant, his heirs, adminis-
trators, assigns or any person interested
in the premises through or under the
defendant."
Perhaps the simplest form of redemp-
tion which is encountered is a redemp-
tion made by the owner of the title to
the property within twelve months after
the judicial sale has been made under
a decree of foreclosure or under a judg-
ment. For the purposes of redemption
twelve months begins and ends upon the
same date. Thus, if a sale of the
premises be made on February 1st of
one year, a redemption by the owner of
the equity may be made on February
1st of the succeeding year, this being
the last day considered to be within the
twelve months period. (Roan v. Rohrer,
72 Ill. 582).
In order to make a redemption under
the statute, it is only necessary for the
redemptioner to pay the amount for
which the property was sold without re-
gard to the amount of the decree. (Ogle
v. Koerner, 140 Ill. 170).
The redemption wipes out the sale and
if the sale was sufficient to pay the judg-
ment or decree in full, no question arises.
The title is in the same position as if
the judgment or decree had been paid
before the sale and since the debt upon
which the decree is rendered has become
merged into the decree, this obligation
disappears. (Butler v. Brown, 205 Ill.
606). In case of a foreclosure of a first
mortgage on property upon which there
is also a second mortgage, the effect of
a redemption by the owner of the fee
title may vary according to different cir-
cumstances. If the second mortgagee did
not file a cross-bill to foreclose his mort-
gage and the decree is confined to the
foreclosure of the first mortgage, then
the redemption by the owner of the title
has this effect:-If the sale is for the
full amount of the first mortgage, his
redemption re-instates the second mort-
gage. If the sale is insufficient to pay
the first mortgage and he is not per-
sonally liable on the first mortgage, his
redemption re-instates the second mort-
gage and he takes free from the deficiency
on the first mortgage. If he is person-
ally liable on the first mortgage, his re-
demption from a sale for less than the
amount due on the first mortgage re-
instates the second mortgage and the
deficiency on the first becomes a lien
on his title. But the results are different
in case the second mortgagee files a
cross-bill and the decree provides for the
sale of the property to satisfy both the
first and second mortgages. If, under
such circumstances, the sale is for the
full amount due on the first and second
mortgages, the redemption by the owner
of the fee simple wipes out the fore-
closure. If the sale is for less than
the amount due the first and second
mortgages and if the owner of the fee
is not personally liable for the debts,
his redemption frees the property from
the lien of the mortgages and the de-
ficiency on the sale. If, however, the
owner of the fee is personally liable for
the debts and redeems from a sale for
less than the amount due under the
decree foreclosing the first and second
mortgages, he takes the title subject to
a charge for the unpaid balance. (Ogle
v. Koerner, Supra. Easter v. Holcomb,
221 Ill. App. 485).
In other words, in case of a redemp-
tion by the owner of the fee, the title
remains in him freed from those debts
upon which the sale was based and for
which he was not personally liable, but
subject, of course, to all junior encum-
brances and liens which, though they
might have been cut off by the issuance
of a master's deed, were not cut off be-
cause of the redemption by the owner.
If, however, he is liable personally to
pay the debt which was the basis of
such judgment or decree, as for example,
if he is the mortgagor or has purchased
the property and has assumed and agreed
to pay the encumbrance, (Miller v.
Thompson, 34 Mich. 10, Albany City Sav-
ings Institute v. Burdick, 87 N. Y. 40)
the sale for less than the amount of
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the decree or judgment does not extin-
guish the debt. In Strause v. Dutch,
250 Ill. 326 at page 330, the Court speak-
ing of this situation says: "Upon the
sale of the premises under the foreclosure
decree, the liens of the two trust deeds
upon which the foreclosure suit was
predicated were extinguished. Those
liens no longer existed and the com-
plainant in the foreclosure suit had se-
cured every benefit possible to be se-
cured under such liens. The debt itself,
however, was not extinguished. A por-
tion of it remained unsatisfied by rea-
son of the failure of the property to
sell for the full amount of the indebted-
ness. Under such circumstances, the
creditor if personal service has been had
upon the debtor, may have a deficiency
decree for the balance due upon which
execution may issue as on a money
decree, (Hurd's Statute 1909, Chapter 95,
Section 16), or he may bring his action
at law and secure judgment for the bal-
ance due. Such deficiency decree or
judgment is secured by no lien whatever.
It is not based upon the lien of the
mortgage but upon the personal liability
of the mortgagor to pay the full amount
of the indebtedness secured by the mort-
gage. A creditor with such a decree or
judgment is on the same footing with
any other decree or judgment creditor of
the debtor and is entitled to employ the
same means to enforce his decree or judg-
ment."
These principles which we have deemed
to be thoroughly established seem to
have been somewhat shaken by the de-
cision of Hack v. Snow in the Appellate
Court of Illinois, First District, handed
down on February 27, 1929, and re-
ported in 252 Ill. App. 51. The facts
briefly were that a decree of foreclosure
was rendered on a mortgage in a pro-
ceeding to which a Judgment creditor
having a lien on the title was made a
party defendant. A sale was had under
the decree of foreclosure and the prop-
erty was sold at the sale for an amount
sufficient to satisfy the mortgage. The
owner of the equity during the period
of redemption conveyed to another who
was not personally liable to pay the judg-
ment of the defendant judgment creditor.
The grantee redeemed within the twelve
months and the Court held that the judg-
ment creditor was cut out and his lien
was lost. The significant paragraph of
the decision reads as follows:
"In order for the defendant Liesik
(judgment creditor) to preserve any
right he may have had in his judgment
against the mortgaged property he should
have bid at the foreclosure sale as pro-
vided by statute. Having failed to do so,
he lost all interest and lien upon the
real estate sold in the foreclosure pro-
ceeding."
This case stands by itself in Illinois
and is directly contrary to several de-
cisions by our Supreme Court. They are:
Davenport v. Karnes, 70 Ill. 465, and
Burgett v. Paxton, 99 Ill. 288. In the
Davenport case the Court said:
"As before said, under the statute upon
this redemption the sale became null and
void. This being so, the premises were
as though no levy and sale had been made
and became liable to levy and sale on
the execution issued on the larger judg-
ment, as that judgment was a lien upon
the premises at the time of the con-
veyance by the judgment debtor."
In other words the Court held that
the redemption within the twelve months
reinstates any liens which exist upon the
property. Under these decisions the hold-
ing in the Hack case should have been
that redemption by the grantee of the
owner of the equity within the twelve
months period left the title in said
grantee subject to the lien of Liesik's
judgment. If the judgment creditor in
the Hack case had filed a cross-bill and
the decree had been on the bill and the
cross-bill and had directed a sale to
satisfy both the mortgage and the judg-
ment, a decision would have been justi-
fied holding that a redemption by the
grantee not personally liable for the
judgment relieved the title of the judg-
ment lien. If the principle of law laid
down in this case prevails, then every
second mortgagee must bid at a first
mortgage foreclosure sale enough money
to pay the first mortgage and his second
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mortgage. Otherwise a grantee of the
owner of the equity or the owner of the
equity if they are not personally liable
on the second mortgage will redeem and
take free and clear of the second mort-
gage. This is not the law as we have
shown and it is hoped that the Supreme
Court will have the opportunity to con-
sider this case and render a correct de-
cision therein.
We pass now to the rights of persons
other than the owner of the title to re-
deem within the twelve months period.
We have quoted the statute. Its lan-
guage is "any defendant, his heirs, ad-
ministrators, assigns or any person in-
terested through or under the defendant."
This is a broad class of persons. But
no matter who redeems within the
twelve months, the title remains in the
owner of the fee and does not change
or pass to any one else by virtue of
the redemption. Whoever redeems as a
defendant within the twelve months
period redeems from the sale and pays
the amount thereof. The effect of such
redemption on the rights accruing to the
redemptioner vary with the different de-
fendants redeeming. The rights of the
owner of the equity redeeming have
already been explained. The rights of
a junior encumbrancer redeeming within
the twelve months are entirely different
from those of the owner. Likewise, the
rights of a tenant are different from
those of the owner or junior encum-
brancer who redeems. The section is so
broad that it gives rise to various aca-
demic questions. For instance, a party
having no interest, yet being a defendant,
might be considered as having a right
to redeem. If he did, he probably would
be a mere volunteer and, of course, would
obtain no title as we have pointed out.
Under the designation of "any person in-
terested" in the premises, it has been
held that a woman having an inchoate
right of dower may redeem in salvage of
her dower. (Bigoness v. Hibbard, 267 Ill.
301).
It Is easily conceivable that tenants
might under certain circumstances re-
deem. For instance, the lessee under a
favorable long term lease, subject to a
trust deed upon the fee might redeem
from a foreclosure in order to preserve
the title of his lessor and so prevent his
lease being destroyed by foreclosure. He
could, undoubtedly, under most leases or
in equity withhold the money so ad-
vanced for redemption from his future
payments of rent and in so doing pro-
tect his lease at no ultimate expense to
himself.
But next in importance to the redemp-
tion by the owner of the fee is the re-
demption by a junior mortgagee or lienor.
We shall, therefore, turn our attention
to the rights which flow from such a
redemption. Here again we must state
at the outset that a junior mortgagee or
lienor obtains no title by redeeming rrom
the sale of a prior lien. His sole right
is to become subrogated to the rights of
the party from whom he has thus re-
deemed and to add to his own mortgage
the amount redeemed and foreclose again
for the amount of his mortgage plus the
redemption money. (Illinois National
Bank v. Trustees of Schools, 211, Ill.
500).
An interesting situation arises where
a junior encumbrancer redeems from a
prior sale but there are intervening
junior encumbrancers having liens su-
perior to that of the redeeming lienor.
To illustrate this, let us assume there are
three mortgages upon a particular piece
of property held by "A", "B" and "C".
"A" forecloses and "C" redeems from
the sale, what are the rights of "B"
The title upon such a redemption re-
mains in the owner of the fee and "C"
having redeemed, is subrogated to the
rights of "A". "C" thereupon proceeds
to foreclose his mortgage plus the re-
demption money advanced by him. "B",
however, can redeem from the foreclosure
sale of "C" by merely paying the re-
demption money advanced by "C" and
"B" is not required to pay "C's" mort-
gage in making such redemption because
"C's" mortgage is subordinate to the
mortgage of "B". See Illinois National
Bank v. School Trustees, 211 Ill. 500.
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Another interesting situation was de-
cided in the case of Flachs v. Kelly and
others, 30 Ill. 462. In this case, Theis,
owning the property in question, executed
two mortgages, the first to Kelly and
the second to Flachs. Subsequent to
these two mortgages, a judgment was
rendered against the owner and in favor
of Chatten. The owner of the first mort-
gage foreclosed his mortgage and the
property was sold. The owner of the
second mortgage then foreclosed his
mortgage and purchased the property at
his own sale. He then made a redemp-
tion within the twelve months period
from the sale under the first mortgage
foreclosure. The judgment creditor, after
the expiration of the twelve months
period from the second mortgage fore-
closure sale, tendered to the Sheriff suffi-
cient money to redeem the property only
from the second mortgage sale contend-
ing that as a judgment creditor, he was
entitled to redeem by paying the amount
of money for which the property was
sold under the second mortgage and need
not pay the money advanced by the
holder of the certificate of sale to redeem
the property from the sale under the
first mortgage. The Court held adversely
to him and declared that in order to re-
deem from the sale under the second
mortgage, he must pay not only the
amount of that sale but also the amount
of the redemption money which the sec-
ond mortgagee advanced to redeem from
the first mortgage sale.
It remains now to explain briefly the
method of effecting a redemption within
the twelve months period. The redemp-
tion is made by paying the money to the
Master, who thereupon files for record,
a certificate of redemption. A redemp-
tion may also be effected by purchasing
the certificate of sale from the holder
thereof and obtaining an assignment
thereof. (Casper National Bank v. Jen-
ner, 268 Ill. 142). It is better practice
to endorse upon the back of said certifi-
cate of sale, so assigned, a brief state-
ment of the intention by the owner to
redeem and to record the certificate so
endorsed but this is unnecessary except
as a matter of notice, and if the certifi-
cate is surrendered even though not re-
corded with the assignment attached
thereto, the redemption takes effect as
between the parties and as to all parties
who may have or may be charged with
notice of the facts. (Casper National
Bank v. Jenner, Supra). However, under
such a state of facts, if the certificate of
redemption is not recorded and a judg-
ment creditor has no actual notice of
such an assignment and redemption, he
is not bound by the redemption and may
after the expiration of twelve months
proceed to redeem as if no redemption
had been made. (Boyton v. Pierce, 151
111. 197).
A different situation arises where a
junior encumbrancer purchases the cer-
tificate of sale issued under the fore-
closure of a prior lien, We have shown
that he has the right to redeem from
a sale under a prior mortgage and by
such redemption place the title in the
owner of the fee subject to his rights
to reimbursement for the redemption
noney expended, plus the amount due
him on his own mortgage. But if he
purchases a prior certificate of sale there
is no implication that he intended to
make a redemption. Of course, in such
a case, if no redemption Is made from
the sale, he will be entitled to a Master's
deed at the end of the fifteen months
period. But such a purchase of a prior
certificate of sale is very unwise because
a judgment creditor may redeem after
the twelve months, if there has been no
redemption within the twelve months.
Under this situation, the judgment
creditor redeeming after the twelve
months would only have to pay the
amount necessary to redeem from the
sale without taking into consideration
the original debt of the junior encum-
brancer who has purchased the certifi-
cate of sale and the junior mortgagee
would lose the amount of his junior
mortgage. This precise case was pre-
sented to the Supreme Court in Shroeder
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v. Bauer, 140 Ill. 135 and the Court in
deciding this situation and laying down
the principles set forth above, said: "But
the appellee contends, that by taking an
assignment of this certificate of sale, he
had in effect redeemed the land and it
was then subject to his mortgage, which
could not be defeated by a judgment
creditor. He is the second mortgagee,
and he purchased the elder certificate of
purchase, and would have been entitled
to a deed under the statute at the end
of fifteen months if no judgment creditor
had redeemed, and would have thus cut
off all subsequent encumbrances. This
he had the unquestioned right to do;
but, having failed to acquire title in that
way, in qpnsequence of the redemption
by the appellant, a judgment creditor,
he can not now claim that he merely re-
deemed as the mortgagee of Davenport,
and in this way annulled the sale."
One more point with reference to re-
demption within the twelve months
period requires consideration. Quite fre-
quently the owner of the certificate of
sale will procure a quit-claim deed from
the owner of the fee. This probably con-
stitutes a redemption on the theory of
merger but would seem to be subject to
the same limitations as if the owner of
the fee purchased the certificate of re-
demption and took no further steps. In
such a case, however, it is safer to treat
this as a redemption as to subordinate
judgments and other liens which may
be or may claim to be revived and re-
instated by such a transaction.
Redemption of Separate Parcels
We next come to the question of re-
demption where the mortgage conveyed
two or more parcels of property. Whether
or not separate owners of separate
parcels of real estate which have been
sold at judicial sale can redeem their
specific parcels depends upon the man-
ner in which the premises were sold.
If the parcels were sold separately at
the judicial sale, the owner of each sepa-
rate parcel may redeem from the sale
of his parcel by paying only the amount
for which that particular parcel was
sold. (Robertson v. Dennis, 20 Ill. 313).
If, however, the various parcels were
sold en masse, they can only be re-
deemed en masse and neither owner can
redeem his separate parcel. Redemption
from such a sale can be made only by
paying to the Master or to the holder
of the certificate of sale, the entire
amount for which all of the property
was sold. (Oldfield v. Eulert, 148 Ill.
614). In the latter case, if the owner
of one parcel redeems, the title to the
parcel which he did not own would vest
in the other owner and the redemptioner
would have only a right of action to
collect the proportionate amount of the
redemption money.
Having before us the proposition that
in case of a redemption within the first
twelve months, the title is merely re-
stored to or remains in the owner of
the fee, the question of the effect of a
redemption by one not entitled to make
it presents little difficulty. The only per-
son who may question such a redemp-
tion is the holder of the certificate of
sale. If he accepts the redemption money
no one else can complain. (Blair v.
Chamblin, 39 Ill. 521). The owner of
the fee, having retained or regained his
title by such redemption is not injured
and the redemptioner has only a doubt-
ful right of action for reimbursement.
Such a redemption even though made by
a stranger cancels the certificate of sale
and prevents further redemption by
judgment creditors.
This, we think, presents most of the
problems which arise in connection with
redemptions within the twelve months
period.
Redemption After Twelve Months
At the expiration of twelve months
from the date of the sale, the right of
redemption of "any defendant, his heirs,
administrators, assigns, or any person
interested in the premises through or un-
der the defendant" is lost and these
parties are absolutely foreclosed. The
right of redemption thereafter and until
the expiration of fifteen months from
the date of the sale is given by the
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Statute to judgment and decree creditors.
Sections 20 to 26, Chapter 77, Cahill's
Revised Statutes, deal with this class
of redemptions and it is our purpose
now to explain this branch of the sub-
ject. Redemptions by judgment and
decree creditors are far more complicated
than the redemptions made within the
twelve months period, and we hope that
we may, in some measure, be able to
clarify the conflicting decisions and
views which exist in this field.
At the outset, let us emphasize that
the foundation of a redemption by a
judgment or decree creditor is a valid
judgment or decree and a valid sale
thereunder. Without that, no good re-
demption can be made. The importance
of this is that under this .class of redemp-
tion, the redemptioner obtains title to
the property. Likewise in the case of
a decree, no good title can be obtained
under a decree unless It is valid and
the sale thereunder is valid. The de-
tails of the operation of these redemp-
tions will appear as we progress, but
these points must be borne in mind
throughout the discussion.
The Statute as we have shown grants
the right to redeem to judgment and
decree creditors. A judgment creditor
is altogether different from a decree
creditor and the machinery of redemp-
tion by one is wholly different from the
machinery by which the other may re-
deem.
Judgment and Decree Creditors
The question as to who is a judgment
creditor within the meaning of the
Statute has frequently received the at-
tention of the Supreme Court. It is ob-
vious that the line must be drawn some-
where. As was stated in Fitch v. Wether-
bee, 110 Ill. 475, "There must be some
limitation as to the particular judgments
who are entitled to redeem.-Whose
judgment creditors are meant by this
Section? Not the judgment creditors of
all the world but only the judgment
creditors of those who had a right to
redeem." It is not necessary to entitle
a judgment creditor to redeem that his
judgment should be a lien upon the
premises. Thus a holder of a judgment
rendered against the mortgagor after he
had parted with his title may, neverthe-
less, redeem from a foreclosure of the
mortgage. This was established as early
as the case of McLagan v. Brown in 11
Il1. 519 and has been many times since
adjudicated. (See Chicago Savings Bank
v. Coleman, 283 Ill. 618. Garden City
Sand Company v. Christley, 289 Ill. 617.
McRoberts v. Conover, 71 Ill. 525. Lloyd
v. Karnes, 45 Ill. 62). But a judgment
creditor having a judgment against a
person in the chain of title who is not
the mortgagor and who has conveyed
prior to the foreclosure suit, obtained
after the conveyance, cannot redeem.
A judgment creditor whose judgment
has been discharged in bankruptcy may
redeem under the Statute. (Pease v.
Ritchie 132 Ill. 638). Of course, a judg-
ment which is a lien upon the premises
may be the basis of a redemption. A re-
demption after twelve months and prior
to fifteen months is not invalid merely
because the judgment creditor was a
party to the suit and as such party might
have redeemed within the first twelve
months period. (Heinroth v. Frost, 250
Ill. 102). So too, a judgment creditor
having a judgment against a person who
died before the judgment creditor could
make a redemption may still redeem
after the death of the judgment debtor.
(Zeman v. Ward, 260 Ill. 93) and by vir-
tue of Section 27 of the Judgment Act,
persons having claims against a deceased
debtor which have been allowed in the
Probate Court may, by following the
method therein provided, make such
redemption, even though such claim has
arisen since the death of the deceased
debtor, namely, one for funeral expenses.
(Zeman v. Ward, Supra).
In order to entitle a Judgment creditor
to redeem, it is not necessary that the
judgment be rendered prior to the decree
of foreclosure. In fact, a judgment
entered after the expiration of twelve
months from the date of sale and sub-
sequent, therefore, to the time when the
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judgment debtor himself might have re-
deemed is a valid basis for redemption.
(Strauss v. Tuckhorn, 200 Ill. 75. Kufke
v. Blume, 304 Ill. 288). It is possible
that under the provisions for successive
redemptions, a judgment creditor might
obtain a judgment more than fifteen
months after the sale of the mortgaged
property and still have a right to redeem.
This interesting situation arose in Meier
v. Hilton reported in 257 Ill. 174.
It is no bar to a valid redemption that
the debtor permitted the judgment to be
entered against him for the sole purpose
of effecting redemption if the judgment
is based on a bona fide debt. (Kufke v.
Blume, 304 Ill. 288).
If the owner of the title conveys his
title within the twelve months period, a
judgment creditor having a judgment
against the grantee may, upon the failure
of his judgment debtor to do so, redeem
from the foreclosure. (Aetna Life In-
surance Company v. Beckman, 210 Ill.
394).
However, in order to entitle a judg-
ment or decree creditor to redeem, he
must have such a judgment or decree as
would authorize a sale of the premises
sought to be redeemed. Thus, a judg-
ment creditor whose judgment has be-
come dormant by the expiration of time
so that an execution cannot be sued out
upon it, cannot redeem. And a decree
creditor whose decree does not authorize
a sale of the premises sought to be re-
deemed cannot redeem. (DeWitt County
Bank v. Mickelberry, 244 Ill. 77). Thus,
the owner of a decree of foreclosure of a
junior mortgage directing the sale of
premises therein described has a right
to redeem as a decree creditor from the
sale of the premises under the fore-
closure of a prior mortgage and it is not
necessary before redeeming that a sale
be first made under the junior mortgage
decree, nor is it necessary that such
decree be a lien.
A decree creditor whose decree au-
thorizes a sale of the premises may re-
deem the premises to the exclusion of
other creditors whose claims are allowed
in the same decree. Thus, If the premises
are sold upon a foreclosure of a first
mortgage and another foreclosure involv-
ing the same premises should proceed to
a decree in which several creditors have
their respective debts established and a
decree entered in their favor, any one of
such creditors may redeem as a decree
creditor and his redemption operates as
if he had obtained a decree in an inde-
pendent action for his sole benefit and
such redemption will not be for the bene-
fit of the other creditors whose debts
form part of the same decree. (Morava
v. Bonner 205 Ill. 321. Whitehead v.
Hall, 148 Ill. 253).
In a late case, the Supreme Court of
Illinois held that a deficiency decree
creditor may redeem from his own sale,
provided, however, that at the time of
deficiency decree was entered, the per-
son primarily liable for the debt was the
holder of the title. (Strause v. Dutch,
250 Il. 326). This case Is one of the
leading cases on redemption in this
State and is often cited. The Court
carefully distinguished this case from
those cases in which the rule was laid
down that property could not be twice
sold for the same debt, stating that such
redemption was not based upon the lien
of the mortgage but upon the personal
liability of the mortgagor to pay the full
amount of the indebtedness secured by
the mortgage. The Court said a creditor
with such a decree or judgment is on
the same footing as any other judgment
or decree creditor and Is entitled to em-
ploy the same means to enforce his
decree or judgment.
Machinery of Redemption by Judgment
Creditors
For the machinery of redemption by
judgment and decree creditors, we must
turn to the Statute. Section 20, Chapter
77, Cahill's 1927 Statutes, provides that
the judgment creditor may sue out an
execution upon his judgment or decree,
place the same in the hands of the
sheriff, who executes it and makes a
levy upon the premises desired to be
redeemed. The person desiring to re-
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deem then pays to the sheriff the amount
necessary to redeem the premises from
the foreclosure sale. It is important that
the amount so deposited be sufficient to
pay the decree with Interest thereon at
the rate of six per cent per annum. In
this connection, the provisions of Section
28 of the Judgment Act must be con-
sidered. This Section provides that the
holder of the certificate of sale may pay
all taxes and special assessments which
are or may become a lien on the real
estate during the period of redemption.
When he has done so and has deposited
his receipts with the master, the redemp-
tioner must reimburse him before he is
entitled to redeem. In all cases of re-
demption, therefore, the master who
made the original sale must be consulted
in order that the deposit shall be great
enough to cover these additional items,
if any there are. Otherwise, the holder
of the certificate could rightfully refuse
the money tendered and at the end of
fifteen months insist upon a deed from
the master. Of course, if the holder of
the certificate accepts the redemption
money, he cannot later complain that it
is inadequate. When the proper amount
has been deposited with the sheriff or
other proper officer, he then advertises
and offers the premises for sale as in
other cases of sale on execution. The
sale is by virtue of the redemption and
pursuant to the execution. At such sale,
the redeeming creditor is considered to
have bid the amount of such redemption
money so paid by him with interest, and
if no greater bid Is received the judg-
ment creditor is immediately entitled to
a deed and no further redemption is
allowed. If, however, a bid is received
greater than the amount of such redemp-
tion money, the property Is sold to the
highest bidder and the purchaser receives
another certificate of sale from which
any judgment creditor may redeem
within sixty days. This is provided for
by Section 23, the language of which is
that: "Successive redemptions may be
made of the premises at any time within
sixty days of the last sale at which they
were sold for more than the amount of
the redemption money, interests and
costs and the premises again sold in
the same manner and upon the same
terms and conditions, and certificates
shall be made In like form and manner
as upon the sale on the first redemption,
and the person redeeming shall be con-
sidered to have bid the amount of his
redemption money, Interest and costs;
and if at any such sale the premises are
not sold for a greater sum, the sheriff
or other officer shall forthwith execute
a deed to the purchaser, and no other
redemption shall be allowed."
Under this Section, it is possible that
successive redemptions may extend the
period of redemption many months be-
yond the fifteen months period. For in-
stance, if at the first redemption sale
more than the redemption money is bid,
the sheriff does not issue a deed, but
issues a certificate of sale to the pur-
chaser at the redemption sale. From the
time of this sale, there is a further
sixty day period of redemption. If, within
that period, another judgment creditor
redeems, he proceeds in exactly the
same manner as the first creditor and
again a sale is conducted by virtue of
the redemption and the execution of the
second creditor. If, at this sale, more
than the redemption money is bid, the
same process is again gone through.
This continues until either one of two
things happens. First, if at the redemp-
tion sale, no more than the redemption
money is bid, a deed is issued forth-
with. Secondly, if the sixty day period
of redemption expires without a further
redemption being made therefrom, a deed
is issued to the purhcaser. When either
of these two events happen, all further
rights of redemption terminate.
Machinery of Redemption by Decree
Creditors
The machinery of redemption by decree
creditors is different from the machinery
of redemption by a judgment creditor.
The difficulty with the redemption by a
decree creditor is that the statute fails to
outline the manner in which he shall
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proceed. The language of the Statute
(Section 20) is important to note. It is
that "any judgment or decree creditor,
his executors, administrators or assigns
may, after the expiration of twelve
months and within fifteen months after
the sale, redeem the premises in the fol-
lowing manner: Such creditor, his exec-
utors, administrators, or assigns may sue
out an execution upon his judgment or
decree, and place the same in the hands
of the Sheriff or other proper officer to
execute the same, who shall endorse upon
the back thereof a levy of the premises
desired to be redeemed." The statute
as may be seen is wholly inapplicable to
a redemption by a decree creditor. A
decree creditor cannot sue out an execu-
tion and levy on property. The pro-
cedure for redemption by a decree cred-
itors has, in fact, been outlined by our
Supreme Court in the case of Whitehead
v. Hall, 148 Ill. page 253, which is the
only case on this subject. There the
Court held that a decree creditor may
redeem from a prior sale by depositing
the redemption money with the Master
who Is named In his decree to sell the
property described in his decree. The
Master, upon the receipt of the redemp-
tion money proceeds to sell under the
decree held by the redeeming decree
creditor. From this point the procedure
is the same as in the case of redemption
by judgment creditors. At the sale, of
course, any one may bid and it will be
considered that the decree creditor bid
the amount of the redemption money.
If no more than the redemption money
is bid the Master issues a deed forth-
with to the redeeming decree creditor.
If more than the redemption money is
bid then the Master issues a certificate
of sale and there is a sixty day period
for further redemptions. When this sixty
day period has expired and no further
redemption has been made the Master
issues a deed to the redeeming decree
creditor.
Preferences in Redemptions
A redemption by a judgment creditor
cuts out judgments and other encum-
brances even though they were prior to
the judgment upon which such redemp-
tion is made. In this respect, this kind
of redemption is materially different
from a redemption made within the
twelve months period. Thus, a judg-
ment creditor under a judgment ren-
dered fourteen months after the fore-
closure sale might by such redemption
obtain the title to the property free and
clear of prior judgments and other
encumbrances in favor of persons who
have not elected to redeem. The effect
of such redemption is. to transfer to the
redeeming creditor all rights belonging
to the original purchaser at the time the
redemption is made so that if the judg-
ment is regularly obtained and will sup-
port a sale and deed, the judgment
creditor who redeems obtains the same
title which the original purchaser would
have obtained under a deed issued by
the Master. (Sutherland v. Long, 273
Ill. 309).
The statute, however, affords ample
protection for senior judgment creditors
against a redemption by a junior judg-
ment creditor which would cut off their
judgments. Section 24 of the Judgment
Act (Chapter 77, Cahill's Statutes) pro-
vides that each judgment creditor has
two. days immediately following the ex-
piration of the twelve months period in
the order of their priority within which
they may redeem. So that if there are
six judgment creditors who are entitled
to redeem from a foreclosure sale, each
one of them has two days in which his
right to redeem is paramount to the
right to redeem of any other judgment
creditor in the order of their seniority,
the senior judgment having the first two
days and the second one the next two
days etc. If a creditor, being for in-
stance, the fifth creditor, should make
redemption on the first day after the end
of the twelve months period his certifi-
cate is subject to the rights of creditors
Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 to redeem within the
two days alloted to each of them. This
they may do by paying the amount of
the foreclosure sale plus interest and
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cost as if the redemption had not been
made by creditor No. 5. (See Chicago
Savings Bank v. Coleman, 283 Ill. 611).
This is a leading case on preferences of
redemption and suggests a very interest-
ing question. It was held that the date
of priority of the judgment was governed
not by the date of the rendition thereof
but by the date upon which said judg-
ment became a lien. Thus in this case, it
was decided that a judgment rendered
in Cook County but upon which no tran-
script was filed in Sangamon County
until after the rendition of a judgment
in Sangamon County was inferior in
point of time to the Sangamon County
judgment which was rendered subsequent
to the one in Cook County. This case
is in conflict with the numerous de-
cisions which hold that a judgment need
not be a lien to be the basis of a valid
redemption.
Effect of Redemption by Judgment and
Decree Creditors
Until the redemption money is posted,
a judgment creditor has no right other
than to demand payment of his judg-
ment and the holder of the certificate
of sale may, by paying his judgment, de-
prive him of his right of redemption.
If, however, a judgment creditor posts
his redemption money with the proper
officer, the holder of the certificate of
sale or any other party interested can-
not prevent a redemption being made by
him by tendering to him the amount of
his judgment. Having posted the re-
demption money and thus made a bind-
ing bid for the property when it is
offered for sale under and by virtue of
his redemption and his execution the
judgment creditor acquires a right of
which he cannot be divested, except with
his consent. (McGowan v. Goldberg, 281
Ill. 547). The posting of the redemption
money does not in itself complete the
redemption and if, with the consent of
the judgment creditor, the holder of the
certificate pays his judgment, the holder
of the certificate will be entitled to n
deed at the end of fifteen months.
(Sutherland v. Long, 273 I1. 309). The
Court in this case said: "Pending re-
demption proceedings by a judgment
creditor, the holder of the certificate of
purchase is not stripped of his rights and
his interest in the premises, and his
certificate of purchase is not extinguished
until he actually accepts the redemp-
tion money or until valid redemption
proceedings have finally culminated in a
deed."
We have seen that to entitle a judg-
ment creditor to redeem after the twelve
months period, he must have a valid
judgment upon which a valid sale may
be made. If, before he makes a redemp-
tion, the judgment creditor causes the
real estate to be sold to satisfj his judg-
ment, what then is his right to redeem?
If he causes a sale to be made of prop-
erty other than the property sought to
be redeemed, he thereby loses his status
as a judgment creditor and cannot re-
deem as a judgment creditor. He must
redeem, if at all, as a defendant within
the twelve months period. If that period
has expired, he cannot redeem at all be-
cause his judgment has been satisfied by
the sale of property. This is the rule,
also where the judgment creditor before
making a redemption causes the property
from which he later seeks to redeem to
be sold to satisfy his judgment. His only
right to redeem would then be within
the twelve months period. His right to
redeem as a judgment creditor will have
ceased. He is no longer a judgment
creditor. His judgment has been satis-
fied by the sale of property. If he allows
the twelve months period to elapse, his
right to redemption is gone.
The effect of redemptions upon a home-
stead estate is interesting and again illus-
trates the difference between a redemp-
tion within twelve months and a redemp-
tion after twelve months. If, for in-
stance, a mortgage is foreclosed in which
the homestead was waived, a redemption
within the twelve months would re-
instate the homestead estate. The situa-
tion is altogether different when a judg-
ment creditor redeems after the twelve
months. While it is true his title is
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based upon his judgment and a sheriff's
sale and deed thereunder which ordi-
narily would not cut out the homestead
estate, yet by virtue of the redemption
as a judgment creditor he receives the
benefits which the original mortgagee
acquired in his original decree of fore-
closure, so that if the homestead was
waived in the mortgage and the home-
stead of the mortgagor was thereby fore-
closed, the judgment creditor making a
redemption under his judgment takes
title free and clear of the homestead of
the owner by virtue of the original fore-
closure. (Schroeder v. Bauer, 140 Ill.
135). This difference is aptly expressed
in Butler v. Brown, 205 Ill. 606 at page
609 "Appellees (being the mortgagors)
by their mortgage to Jane Hand had
made this release of homestead as pro-
vided in this Section and it was there-
fore included in the foreclosure sale of
August 19, 1901. From that sale, how-
ever, the appellant (the holder of the
certificate of sale) could redeem by vir-
tue of Section 18 of our Statutes as one
interested in the premises, the only effect
of his redemption, as provided in that
Section, being to render null and void
the sale and certificate of the Master. No
greater right is conferred by that Sec-
tion. If he had redeemed as a judgment
creditor, as provided by Sections 20 to
24 of the same Chapter, the right acquired
would have related back to the judgment
or decree from which the redemption was
made, and would be paramount to any
title acquired subsequent to the beginning
of the lien of such judgment or decree
and would, in this case, have covered the
homestead rights of the appellees."
In order that the redemption by the
judgment creditor be a valid one, it is
necessary first that the foreclosure pro-
ceedings from which redemption is made
be valid. Even though the judgment is
valid, if the foreclosure is invalid, the
redemption by the judgment creditor is
void and no title will be acquired thereby.
(Mulvey v. Carpenter, 78 Ill. 580).
It is necessary also that the judgment
upon which redemption is made be
against the holder or former holder of
the entire title. Thus, a redemption by
the holder of a judgment against a life-
tenant gives to such judgment creditor,
the interest of the life-tenant only.
(Schroeder v. Bozarth, 224 Ill. 310).
Where two parcels are sold en masse
and the ownership is in separate per-
sons, a judgment creditor of one of them
upon redemption from a foreclosure of
both parcels acquires title only to the
lot owned by his judgment debtor.
(Huber v. Hess, 191 Ill. 305). Likewise
a judgment creditor having a judgment
against the holder of an undivided one-
half of the title obtains upon redemption
from a sale of the wh )le title, title only
to the undivided one-half against which
his judgment was effective. (Sledge v.
Dobbs, 254 Ill. 130).
Let us consider finally the effect of
an invalid redemption. This situation
was thoroughly discussed in two cases
decided by the Supreme Court, namely,
Sutherland v. Long 273 Ill. 309 and Hut-
son v. Wood, 263 Ill. 376. In the Suther-
land case, the Court while deciding that
the judgment creditor did not make an
invalid redemption in the case before it,
stated the following principles: "If, after
the expiration of the twelve months, the
premises are redeemed by one not a judg-
ment creditor, the acceptance of the re-
demption money by the holder of the
certificate of purchase relieves the legal
title of the debtor from the lien of the
certificate of purchase even though the
one redeeming cannot enforce his claim
by a resale of the land. Upon the ac-
ceptance of the money by the holder of
the certificate, all his interests would
have been extinguished immediately
whether the judgment creditor had the
right to redeem or not." In Hutson v.
Wood, 263 Ill. 376 the Court summed up
at length the law upon this subject in
a splendidly written opinion and decreed
the return of the redemption money
which had been paid for an invalid re-
demption, saying: "The rule of caveat
emptor applies to sales upon execution
and judicial sales, and we know of no
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case where a purchaser at such a sale,
in the absence of a statute, has been
enabled to recover the money paid, either
for a defective title or where for want
of power to make the sale he has
acquired no title. The power of a sheriff
to sell land upon execution and to con-
vey the land sold is statutory and de-
pends upon the validity of the process,
which, in turn, must be based upon a
valid judgment. If the judgment is void,
the execution, sale and deed are neces-
sarily void. Neither in law or equity
can a court aid the defective execution
of a power conferred by law whereby the
title of one person's property may be
transferred to another. Wood and Stot-
lar acquired no title by virtue of the
sheriff's sale and deed and have there-
fore no defense which they can interpose
to a suit for the possession. (Meyer v.
Mintonye, 106 Ill. 414). They did, how-
ever, purchase at the void sale in good
faith, in the belief that they were ob-
taining a good title and the money they
paid extinguished the certificate of sale
under the foreclosure proceedings. It is
contended, on the one hand, that they
are entitled, in equity, to be reimbursed
the amount of the encumbrance from
which the land was relieved by their pay-
ment before they can be deprived of its
possession. On the other hand, it is in-
sisted that they are volunteers, and hav-
ing advanced their money voluntarily on
the faith of a void sale must abide the
tonsequences and are entitled to no re-
lief. So far as the partition suit in-
volving Lot 23, in which Mrs. Hutson is
complainant and is asking to have the
sale removed as a cloud upon her title,
is concerned, there can be no doubt of
the power of the court to compel her, as
a condition to granting the relief asked
to reimburse Wood and Stotlar for the
amount paid to relieve her land of the
encumbrance. She is seeking equitable
relief, and, under the doctrine that he
who seeks equity must do equity, may
be compelled, before relief will be
granted, to do what equity requires of
her. This principle is constantly ap-
plied in suits brought to set aside void
tax deeds, and the same rule applies to
a suit to set aside a deed upon a void
execution sale."
It is to be noted here, however, that
the purchasers at the sale made pursuant
to the redemption were not parties to
the judgment and the Court stressed the
fact that they were innocent purchasers.
It is doubtful whether or not the Court
would make a similar decision in a case
where the judgment creditor himself
was the purchaser at the redemption
sale. It seems to us that he should be
protected just as fully as third parties
bidding at the sale for the reason that
his money has gone to extinguish the
certificate of sale and certainly any one
asking for equitable relief against him
should be required to do equity for him
just as much as for a third party.
This principle of reimbursement, how-
ever, is quite different from the rule laid
down where a judgment is effective as
to part and invalid as to part as, for
instance, against one of two co-owners.
In Sledge v. Dobbs, Supra, the Court
specifically denied any claim for contri-
bution saying that the judgment creditor
was presumed to have made the redemp-
tion in order to acquire the title of his
judgment debtor and the fact that he
incidentally freed the property of his
judgment debtor's co-owner from the lien
of the foreclosure sale gave him no rights
whatever in the title of said co-owner.
Redemption by a Co-Tenant
Section 26 of the Judgment Act (Chap-
ter 77 Cahill's Statutes) provides that
any joint owner, his executors, adminis-
trators or assigns or a decree or judg-
ment creditor of such joint owner may
redeem the interest of such joint owner
in the premises sold on execution or
decree in the manner and upon the con-
ditions specified in the statute upon the
payment of such proportion of the
amount which would be necessary to re-
deem the whole. Thus, if the title is
in two tenants in common during the
twelve months period, either one of
them may redeem his undivided one-half
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interest from the sale by tendering one-
half of the amount of the sale, costs, and
interests. He would thereupon be en-
titled to his undivided one-half while
the purhcaser at the end of the period,
if no further redemption was made,
would be entitled to a deed to an un-
divided one-half. Within the twelve
months period, however, a co-tenant who
redeems all of the property redeems for
the benefit of all of his co-owners and
while entitled to contribution from them
is not entitled to make such redemption
for his own sole benefit. (Donason v.
Barbero, 230 Ill. 138). This. seems
simple and probably would be simple
were it not for a decision rendered in
Sledge v. Dobbs, 254 Ill. 130. In this
case, the title to the property in ques-
tion was in Sophronia A. Sledge and her
husband, Joseph. They executed a mort-
gage which was foreclosed. Twelve
months having expired, a judgment
creditor of Joseph Sledge made a re-
demption of the premises under and by
virtue of which the property was sold,
and a Sheriff's Deed issued. Of course,
since the judgment was only upon the
undivided interest of the husband, there
seems to be no doubt that the Sheriff's
Deed based on such redemption could
and did convey only such undivided in-
terest. However, the Court made the fol-
lowing statement which can hardly be
reconciled with the language of Section
26 of the statute: "There was no obliga-
tion upon the judgment creditors of
Joseph J. Sledge to redeem the land
from the mortgage sale. It is true if
they redeem at all they will be required
to pay the whole amount the land sold
for, and this would free the land from
any lien on account of said mortgage
sale." In this case, it was decided that
a redemption having been made by pay-
ing all of the redemption money, the
interest of Sophronia was freed from the
mortgage debt and she retained her fee
title free and clear not only of the lien
of the certificate of sale but even of the
necessity to contribute to such judgment
creditor for any portion of the redemp-
tion money. In view of the language of
Section 26, we hesitate to agree with the
statement that the judgment creditor
was forced to redeem in full in order to
make a redemption of an undivided
interest. The case is undoubtedly correct
to the extent that it holds that if a judg-
ment creditor of one co-tenant pays the
redemption money in full, he acquires
only the title of the co-tenant against
whom he holds a judgment and the title
of both co-tenants is completely freed
from the lien of the mortgage sale.
(Sutherland v. Long, 273 Ill. 309 at page
315).
In favor of the right of a judgment
creditor of one co-tenant to redeem by
paying only a proportionate share of the
redemption money, the case of Schuck v.
Gerlach, 101 Ill. 338 seems to point out
a more sensible rule to be applied in this
kind bf a case. The facts were that the
mortgagor died, and his heirs, five in
number became seized of the equity of
redemption by descent. After foreclosure
and sale, they having failed to redeem,
creditors having judgments against two
of them each redeemed an undivided one-
fifth by tendering one-fifth of the redemp-
tion money. When this had been com-
pleted, a third creditor having a judg-
ment against the deceased mortgagor
whereby he was entitled to redeem the
entire premises, attempted to make a re-
demption by tendering the entire redemp-
tion money. The Court held that the re-
demptions by the two creditors having
judgments against two of the heirs were
valid and that the creditor of the mort-
gagor was entitled to redeem and acquire
by his redemption only the remaining
undivided three-fifths. Therefore, with
reference to property owned jointly, it
seems to be the law, (1) that a creditor
of each co-tenant may redeem the share
of the co-tenant against whom he holds
a judgment by depositing the propor-
tionate share of the redemption money.
(2) If, however, in error the judgment
creditor deposits the entire redemption
money, the remaining co-tenants against
whom he has no judgment regain their
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title freed from all lien created by the
foreclosure sale and the redeeming credi-
tor is not entitled to contribution. (3) A
redemption by one creditor of one co-
tenant is no bar to a redemption of the
balance of the title by another creditor
having a judgment against the holder of
the balance of the title with which he
might redeem the remaining portion
from such a sale. (4) Within the first
twelve months, a co-owner may redeem
his share without redeeming the whole
but if he does redeem the whole, he does
so for the joint benefit of all the owners
and while entitled to contribution is not
entitled to the entire title.
Redemption by a Claimant Under a
Claim Filed in the Probate Court
Section 27 of the Judgment Act pro-
vides that any person having a claim in
the Probate Court against the estate of
a deceased debtor shall be considered a
judgment creditor. Redemption in such
a case is quite similar to the redemp-
tion of a judgment creditor and this
Section authorizes the issuance of a spe-
cial execution by the Clerk of the Probate
Court, directed to the Sheriff, authorizing
him to levy on and sell the property
from which redemption is sought. The
holder of this execution is in the same
position from this period on as the
holder of an execution under a judgment.
As stated above, any claim properly
allowed may be the basis of such re-
demption, even though the claim was
one arising subsequent to the date of
the death of the debtor, as for instance,
one arising for the funeral expenses of
the debtor. The case of Zeman v. Ward,
260 Ill. 93 is probably the best one upon
redemptions under claims in the Probate
Court. In Zeman v. Ward, Supra it was
urged that the claimant before being per-
mitted to make a redemption should file
a petition, give notice to the heirs and
allege the insufficiency of the personal
assets to pay all claims against the estate
as in the case of the proceedings in the
Probate Court to sell the real estate of
the decedent to pay debts. The Court,
however, held that none of these things
was required by the Statute and that the
Statute does not make the right to re.-
deem contingent upon the insolvency of
the estate or the insufficiency of the per-
sonal assets and does not require a peti-
tion to the Court or notice to any one.
Effect of Redemption on Rents, Issues
and Profits
In the absence of any express pro-
vision in a trust deed or mortgage sought
to be foreclosed, the rents, issues and
profits during the period provided for
redemption, belong to the owner of the
fee, that is, the owner of the right to re-
deem. (Standish v. Musgrove, 223 Ill.
500). This is based upon the theory that
the holder of the certificate of sale has
no interest in the premises foreclosed ex-
cept the right either to the return of
his money by redemption or to a deed
to the premises at the expiration of the
statutory period of redemption.
It has long been the law that the owner
of the indebtedness upon which fore-
closure is sought may also file a petition
to have a receiver appointed to manage
and control the mortgaged property with-
out any specific authority to do so in the
trust deed. Whether or not a receiver
should be appointed rests within the dis-
cretion of the Court and depends pri-
marily upon the proof that the property
was scant security for the mortgage
sought to be foreclosed. (Orlengen v.
Rice, 104 Ill. App. 428). This remedy,
however, was more or less uncertain
since it depended upon the discretion of
the judge presiding at the hearing. To
overcome this, the modern form of trust
deeds almost universally contains a pro-
vision to the effect that pending fore-
closure proceedings, a receiver may be
appointed. Under such a grant of
authority a receiver may be appointed
without regard to the solvency of the
mortgagor or the security of the prop-
erty. (Bagley v. Illinois Trust and Sa-
ings Bank, 199 Ill. 76). If, pursuant to
such foreclosure proceedings the prop-
erty is sold and upon such sale the full
amount of the decree is obtained, the
owner of the right to redeem may peti-
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tion to have the receiver discharged since
1ere is no longer need for him, the
mortgage having been paid in full by
the sale. (Davis v. Dale, 150 Ill. 239.
Bogardus v. Moses, 181 Ill. 554).
A different question arises, however,
when there is a deficiency found due the
mortgagee after the sale of the premises.
In the absence of any provision pledg-
ing the rents, issues and profits of the
property during the period of redemption,
the mortgagee is not, as a matter of
right, entitled to receive the rents dur-
ing such period, such relief depending
upon the discretion of the Court. (Ball
v. Marske, 202 Ill. 31. Schaeppi v. Bar-
tholomae, 217 Ill. 105). To avoid this
situation, the modern form of trust deed
contains a pledge of such rents, issues
and profits during the period of redemp-
tion as further security for the mort-
gage debt. Such a pledge is valid and
under it the Court has authority to con-
tinue the receiver in possession of the
premises during the statutory period of
redemption. Thus, if a redemption is
made by one not personally liable for
the deficiency and if the rents are
pledged in the mortgage and if, in addi-
tfon, the decree orders the continuance
of the receivership, such receiver could
probably collect the rents, issues and
profits during the entire fifteen months
applying them upon the deficiency even
though there has been a redemption from
the sale. (Oakford v. Robinson, 48 Ill.
App. 270). Still another question arises.
May a receiver be continued after
redemption if notwithstanding a pledge
of rents in a mortgage the decree of
foreclosure fails to provide for the col-
lection of the rents to satisfy any de-
ficiency there may be? Upon this point
the law is less certain, but the answer
to the question seems to depend not
merely upon the holder of the right to
redeem being personally liable for the
deficiency, but also whether or not the
holder of the right to redeem purchased
the same before or after the entry of
the decree of foreclosure. Under the
decision in Lightcap v. Bradley, 186 Ill.
510 as we have seen all the rights of the
mortgagee merge in the decree of fore-
closure and subsequent purchasers need
look only to the decree to determine the
condition of the foreclosure. From this
it would seem to follow that if subse-
quent to the decree a person not liable
for the deficiency should purchase the
right to redeem and redeem, he would
be entitled to have the receiver dis-
charged immediately notwithstanding
the trust deed foreclosed contained an
express pledge of rents and profits. How-
ever, an entirely different situation arises
if he purchased prior to the decree of
foreclosure, even though he is not liable
primarily for the debt, for in this case
it would probably be held that he pur-
chased the property subject to the mort-
gage and to all of its terms and the sub-
sequent omission in the decree might not
relieve him of the pledge of rents. If
in such a case, a receiver is appointed
during the foreclosure proceedings, he
probably can continue to collect the
rents pledged in the mortgage and apply
them upon the deficiency decree even
though redemption is made before the
fifteen months period expires by one not
liable for the deficiency. (Oakford v.
Robinson, 48 Ill. App. 270). In this case,
the Court said: "Appellee's title to the
property was subject to the mortgage and
his right to the rents and profits of the
land was, under the mortgage and decree
of Court, secondary to that of the appel-
lants (mortgagees). The payment by
the appellee to the Master in Chancery
of the amount requisite under the Statute
to effect redemption from the sale did
not operate to destroy the lien of the
appellants and such lien remained un-
affected by the redemption and could
only be satisfied by the payment of the
deficiency or by the application by the
receiver of the rents and profits toward
the payment of such unpaid balance."
This decision has been several times
cited with approval and in Owsley v.
Neeves, 179 Ill. App. 61, the Court said:
"Rents and profits are the subject of
mortgage. The mortgagee has a specific
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lien upon the rents and profits of mort-
gaged land when they are expressly
pledged by the mortgage as part of the
security. The appellant was bound by
those terms of the trust deed and the
chancellor could not legally or equitably
decree otherwise than that the appellees
were entitled to have their deficiency
decree or judgment paid out of the rents
in question." To the same effect is Town-
send v. Wilson, 155 Ill. App. 303. This
being the uncertain state of the law, it
would be unsafe to assume that a re-
demption terminates every receivership.
Where the rents are specifically pledged
in the trust deed foreclosed, it is prob-
able that our Courts will permit the re-
ceiver to remain in possession for the
full fifteen months, notwithstanding a re-
demption by one not liable for the pay-
ment of the deficiency decree.
Redemption Under Section 19 of the
Chancery Act
In addition to the statutory rights of
redemption heretofore discussed another
right of redemption exists from all sales
made under and by virtue of decrees in
chancery in favor of defendants served
by publication. The importance of this
right of redemption is not fully appreci-
ated by Illinois lawyers nor is there a
proper understanding of the serious effect
upon the marketability of titles and the
collectibility of mortgages or other liens
which must be enforced in equity. In
the majority of cases of foreclosure of
liens in the City of Chicago there exists
a three year right of redemption in favor
of some of the defendants to the suit for
reasons which will appear as we progress.
The result is that it actually takes three
years or more to make a collection of
the money due on a mortgage or me-
chanic's lien. There are upon our Statute
Book several Sections (Sections 7 and
12, Chapter 22, Cahill's Illinois Statutes)
which provide for suing persons who
have or may have an interest in the
property which is the subject matter of
the suit where such persons reside be-
yond the boundaries of this State or can-
not be found. Such persons may be sued
and brought before the Court by the
publication of a notice in the manner
prescribed by the Statute. In case there
are persons who have or may have an
interest in the property which is the sub-
ject matter of the suit, whose names are
unknown, they may be made defendantr
by the designation of "unknown owners,"
and publication may also be made against
them to bring them before the Court.
In Illinois and particularly in Chicago
and its suburbs it has long been the prac-
tice to lend money on real estate, tak-
ing as evidence of the debt, notes pay-
able to bearer which are secured by a
trust deed running usually to a corporate
trustee. Nothing appears on the records
showing the ownership of the notes and
trust deed. If, therefore, there are two
or three trust deeds on a piece of prop-
erty, the holder of the first trust deed
seeking to foreclose it must make parties
defendant not only the trustee in the
subordinate trust deeds, but also the
owner of the notes. Since the record
does not show the ownership of the notes
and the trustee seldom knows the facts
the complainant is driven to make the
owners of such notes defendants by the
designation of unknown owners of notes.
He proceeds to a decree of sale and we
come then to the rights of these unknown
owners to redeem. Section 19 of the
Chancery Act, Chapter 22, Cahill's
Statutes provides that "when any final
decree shall be entered against any de-
fendant who shall not have been sum-
moned or been served with a copy of the
bill or received the notice required to be
sent him by mail and such person, his
heirs, devisees, executor, administrator
or other legal representatives, as the case
may require, shall within one year after
notice in writing given him of such
decree or within three years after such
decree, if no such notice shall have been
given as aforesaid, ,appear in open Court
and petition to be heard touching the
matter of such decree, and shall pay such
costs as the Court shall deem reasonable
in that behalf. The person so petitioning
may appear and answer the complainants'
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bill, and thereupon such proceedings
shall be had as if the defendants had ap-
peared in due season, and no decree had
been made. And if it shall appear, upon
the hearing, that such decree ought not
to have been made against such defen-
dant, the same may be set aside, altered
or amended as shall appear just; other-
wise the same shall be ordered to stand
confirmed against said defendant." The
statute is absolutely silent on the matter
of redemption. The language of the stat-
ute would seem to limit the right of the
parties served by publication to having
the decree reviewed and modified or va-
cated, if upon their defense the Court
should deem that relief proper. But our
decisions leave no room for doubt that
the Statute grants an absolute right to
redeem within three years from the date
of the decree regardless of whether or
not the decree was altered or amended.
See Seymour v. Bailey, 66 Illinois 288.
Northern Trust Company v. Sanford, 308
Illinois 381. It has become the habit of
many lawyers to add to the list of de-
fendants in foreclosure suits not only
"unknown owners of certain notes spe-
cifically described," but "unknown own-
ers" generally. Their idea, as we gather
it, is to be sure every one is before the
Court and that thereby a perfect pro-
ceeding Is being conducted. We have en-
countered many cases where there was
no necessity whatever for making un-
known owners defendants. That is, there
were no Junior Trust Deeds and nothing
of record to require it, and yet "unknown
owners" were sued. The result of such
procedure is to create a three year period
of redemption which would otherwise not
exist at all, thereby making the title
practically unsalable for three years and
postponing the collection of the debt for
a like period. This is very unwise prac-
tice and should be discontinued. Like-
wise we have often seen cases where non-
resident persons have been served by pub-
lication in foreclosure cases when it was
possible to serve them by copy of the
bill. Had they been served in that man-
ner their right of redemption would have
expired at the end of 15 months from
the date of the sale. But because they
were published against their right to re-
deem extended during 3 years from the
entry of the decree.
Such is the three year period of re-
demption under our Laws and it is
hoped that the money lenders who suffer
the most from laws which make it diffi-
cult for them to collect their loans will
sometime seek relief by appealing to the
Legislature for a modification of this
Section of our Statute.
Conclusion
We have, we believe, discussed all the
important problems which arise in this
difficult branch of Real Property Law.
There are, of course, many minor points
which have not been touched upon and
there are many decisions which have
not been cited. Our only hope is that
this essay may prove to be of some value
to those who may find occasion to stray
in this labyrinth of law.
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